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Foreword 
The thirty-fourth Dana Boardman Lecture of Christian Ethics 
at the University of Pennsylvania was delivered by the Rt. Revd. 
Lord Robert Runcie, Retired Archbishop of Canterbury. Ar- 
chbishop Runcie's presentation represents well his interest in 
and experience of the complex intersection between religion 
and world events. Both his honest consideration of the difficult 
history of the Christian Church, and his call to greater 
understanding of other religions reflect his long work with and 
commitment to these issues. His refusal to simplify the pro- 
blems tied to religion is characteristic both of his efforts to find 
real solutions to world problems and his intellectual rigor. 
Archbishop Runcie is an academic, religious leader, and inter- 
national advocate for peace and understanding among people 
of different cultures and religions. He has taught both Classics 
and Church History and continues to do research in these areas. 
As Bishop of St. Albans and Archbishop of Canterbury he travel- 
ed extensively and participated in many ecumenical discus- 
sions. He is a founding member of The Religious Forum for 
Global Survival. In addition, as the leader of the diverse and 
fractious Anglican community, Archbishop Runcie's own 
mediating skills have been tested: among other duties, he 
presided successfully over the difficult Lambeth conference 
in 1988 at which social issues were hotly debated. Recently, 
he has continued his commitment to the study of many religions 
by becoming an ambassador for the Centre for Advanced 
Religious and Theological Studies at Cambridge University. He 
participates in several organizations devoted to social issues, 
such as international aid and development, and the Church's 
activity in inner cities. 
I would like to thank Professor E. Ann Matter for her assistance 
in preparing this publication. 
Erica C. Gelser 
University of Pennsylvania 
Faculty, 1995-96 
Department of Religious Studies 
University of Pennsylvania 
-Edward Breuer, Ph.D., Harvard, Assistant Professor, 
Medieval and Modern Judaism 
Stephen N. Dunning, Ph.D., Harvard, Associate Professor, 
Modern Western Religious Thought and Methodology 
Robert A. Kraft, Ph.D., Harvard, Professor, Hellenistic 
Religions: Judaism and Christianity 
E. Ann Matter, Ph.D., Yale, Chair and Professor, History of 
Christianity, Medieval Thought, Women and Religion 
Barbara R, von Schlegell, M.A., U.C. Berkeley, Lecturer, 
Islamic Religion 
Guy R. Welbon, Ph. D., Chicago, Associate Professor, 
Religions of Southern Asia, Hinduism and Buddhism, 
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During the 1939145 War I was a combatant soldier in north-west 
Europe. When it ended I was attached as a young staff officer to 
the Four Party Italo-Yogoslav Boundary Commission. Our task 
was to draw boundaries between Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. 
The American delegation was led by an ethnic expert. There was 
a French delegation led by a diplomat and an economist. The 
Russians were led by a good party politician. The British had a 
lawyer who had never been to that part of the world but knew 
how to ask pertinent questions. It was my first introduction to 
official diplomacy. I was completely fascinated by it. I 
postponed my return to Oxford to complete my undergraduate 
education in order to see it through. We toured around the 
border lands and discovered what language people used at home 
or in school or at church - whether Serbo-Croat, Slovene or 
Italian, what customs and attitudes flavored their lives. 
Being young I was inclined to be cynical. It seemed to me that 
each delegation knew the line which it intended to draw before it 
listened to any evidence. I was perhaps over critical; for this was 
one of the few major border disputes that has been settled 
amicably by compromise between the nations. So far, this has 
been one corner of the ghastly mess which was once Yugoslavia 
which has not produced major conflict. However, one criticism 
which I felt even then and which still has force is that none of 
the delegations knew much about religion. Without a sense of 
history and religion, it was difficult to understand the passions 
of the people whose destiny we were ordering. It was a huge 
influence on all the parties to the conflict. Perhaps the all-too- 
contemporary awfulness of Fascism, and the growing threat of 
Stalinist Communism, provided a misleading alibi for 
interpreting the terrible things which were still happening in the 
region. There was more to it than that, as we have now realized. 
Last year in Cyprus I met a Serbian bishop. I have known him 
for many years. He is a saintly pastor, and a dedicated patriot. 
"We lived under the Muslims for 300 years", he said; "they must 
never be allowed to get a foot-hold in Europe again. That is what 
we are fighting for. Why do you not understand?" quote that 

annihilate the other. So Christianity developed the language of 
Crusade, Islam speaks of Jihad, and classical Marxism envisages 
history as the struggle of classes. But what are we to make of 
life-and-death struggles within Christianity, the religion of love 
and forgiveness? To begin to understand these, we need to 
realize just how deep-rooted is the conflict within Christianity 
between the particular or the local and the universal. We will 
need to go right back to the beginnings of the dhristian Church. 
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Christianity is a self-proclaimed universalist religion. It began as 
a rebellious offshoot of Judaism, a faith which had a complex 
attitude to its place in the world. Certainly the Jewish people did 
proclaim their particular separateness and uniquely privileged 
place in the eyes of God; yet they did so in order to proclaim the 
good news of God to the whole world. Judaism had messages for 
all people: its prophets Amos, Hosea and Isaiah preached that all 
slaves should be freed, not just Jewish slaves, and that the one 
God was the God of all. So Judaism's unique privilege and its 
difference came to be seen as its teaching role for the world: an 
obligation to act morally, to be a light to the nations. 
L 
The form of Christianity which became dominant took this 
universalist message and transformed it: that is why it broke 
with its Jewish parent. Here I am on delicate ground, because so 
often Christians have caricatured Judaism in the age of Jesus 
Christ in order to justify how Christianity developed. Perhaps I 
should describe what happened simply in terms of what the early 
Christians thought that they were doing. They saw themselves as 
pulling down barriers built around Judaism: barriers which for 
many first-century Jews were precisely what symbolized their 
teaching role for the world. Notoriously, the best-known 
spokesman for this transformation, Paul of Tarsus, repeatedly 
proclaimed that in Christ there is no difference between Jew and 
Greek. He extended this list in his epistle to the Galatians into a 
three-fold abolition: no difference between Jew and Greek, slave 
and free, male and female. -. -. ,: 
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The Galatians message lies like a ticking bomb at the base of 
every clerical or social structure. It says, "when Adam delved 
and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?' It says, as Jesus 
challenged to a young man of wealth, "give away all you have 
and follow me". It says what the Grand Inquisitor says to Christ 
in The Brothers Karamazov. In other words, the institutional 
Church stands on a seething and unstable core of love and 
equality. . 
However, the intellectual afterlife of this passage of Galatians is 
significant. In the first place, it was the vision of a man who was 
convinced that the Roman world which he knew was about to 
shrivel up and be replaced by the kingdom of Christ. The 
abolition of difference would be the central characteristic of this 
new order of existence. The Galatians proclamation was so 
radical as to relate very imperfectly to the everyday world of the 
first-century Roman Empire. In the Pauline tradition, it stands 
alongside what appears to be a directly contradictory line of 
rhetoric: wives obey your husbands, slaves obey your masters, 
children obey your parents. This second list was a code for a 
world in which the Last Judgment did not in the event come 
quickly, and it was this formula which set the norms of Christian 
practice, which were not especially different from the norms of 
the society round about it. Far from challenging the status quo in 
everyday life, Pauline Christianity rapidly became ready to 
reinforce it. 
Therefore the abolition of difference between Jew and Greek, 
slave and free, male and female was of strictly limited everyday 
significance. If the Galatians proclamation did have an 
immediate practical relevance, it was largely through its first 
clause: no difference between Jew and Greek. This was 
important because it touched on the basic Christian revolt from 
Jewish identity. Apart from that, Paul's proclamation was not 
taken as a practical program of action. Its reference was to the 
spiritual relationships in the world. Only gradually has it taken 
on new resonances for everyday society, resonances which the 
early Christians did not hear. Only in the eighteenth century did 
Western Christianity begin its wholehearted commitment to the 
abolition of slavery worldwide, and in the United Sates, you 
hardly need me to tell you how bitter a struggle it was to 
establish this idea as normative. Now in the twentieth, we are 
beginning to explore how the third clause might cause a similar 
transformation in the relationships between the sexes; and the 
struggle is again a bitter and painful one. 
To say that in Christ there was neither Jew nor Greek did have a 
further practical significance in the late first century of the 
Common Era. Even if after it had done its work of separating 
Christianity from Judaism, the statement seemed to describe the 
Christian Church as it was: It was fairly culturally homogenous 
body, a fusion of a Greek with a Jewish heritage. In terms of 
ideas, Christianity very quickly became concerned with oneness. 
Christians argued fiercely about the boundaries of their faith, 
and the Christians who won these arguments were those who 
wished to impose unity and uniformity on the Christian 
proclamation: they called the Christianity which resulted 
"universal", or in Greek Katholikos. So Christian universality 
now had two aspects: unlike Judaism, it was a religion self- 
consciously available to all without qualification, yet it was also 
universal because it was the same everywhere. 
The Christians of Paul's successor-church were therefore one in 
their culture. Characteristically they were urban people who 
spoke a form of workaday Greek which was the common 
language of trading people in cities all round the Mediterranean. 
Even in Rome, most Christians seem to have spoken this Greek 
rather than Latin for a century or so after Paul's death. But after 
that came the first of Christianity's cultural divides. Christianity 
began capturing the allegiance of the aristocracy and 
administrative class in the Western Empire. This meant that its 
western identity became increasingly Latin-speaking; and that 
would have profound consequences for its future. The split 
between Latin West and Greek East was given a political 
reinforcement in the late third century when the Empire itself 
was officially divided for administrative purposes between west 

one of the reasons for the rapid Islamic success when Islamic 
armies attacked the Byzantine Empire, was that many such 
alienated Christian groups welcomed the invaders as liberators 
from the official imperial Church which they hated. 
Semitic-speaking Christians did not want their doctrines to be 
shaped to fit Greek philosophical exactitude. The statement of 
Mohammed that Christians and Jews had complicated the simple 
message of Abraham and Jesus appealed to them. 
Let us recap this lightning survey of the first six centuries of 
Christian history. We have seen a faith develop which certainly 
had a commitment to universalism: openness to all, and oneness 
in belief. Probably that is one reason why fourth-century 
emperors allied with it, seeing these universal claims as a 
potential source of unity, keeping together their huge territories. 
Yet this faith had also become one of cultural and political 
divisions. Versions of it had already become identified with 
cultural and linguistic groupings and these divisions eventually 
helped to pull the Roman Empire apart. 
In the West from the fifth century, a new sort of universality 
would succeed to that of the fallen Western Empire, and it was 
universally identified with the Catholic Church. Partly this was 
faute de mieux. When the structures of the Empire disappeared, 
often there was no vehicle left to represent the old culture or 
give it coherence other than the church. Bishops and their clergy 
functioned in some sense like the last surviving wing of the 
Roman imperial service. This was a recurrent feature of the 
centuries which followed; whenever alternative power structures 
faltered and decayed, the Church asserted its everyday power in 
everyday society. One of the most remarkable developments of 
the tenth century was the concept of the peace or the truce of 
God, which developed in France where the monarchy had 
virtually collapsed into anarchy. Thereafter the peace of God 
ideal was to be found in parts of Europe where the same political 
circumstances aiose. In the middle of chaos, bishops of the 
Church met in council and declared that Christians should never 
kill Christians. They gave their reason in a very basic theological 
analogy: "For no one doubts that to kill a Christian is to shed the 
blood of Christ." 
It was impossible for bishops to suppress violence; it was built 
into the society of their day. But they could extend peace as far 
as they could. They protected certain places and people - 
forbidding warriors to storm and plunder churches, attack 
helpless peasants and merchants, for instance. Another approach 
to the truce of God was to forbid violence on the most holy days 
of the year: Easter for instance, or even every Sunday - or even, 
by extension, the days of every week leading up to the Sundays, 
from Wednesday evening onwards. The bishops were probably 
pushing their luck by that stage; but they achieved much in a 
violent age and they created some structure and rules of conduct 
where there had been none. These are the origins of 
humanitarian laws in time of war. They are still around in the 
United Nations and in courts such as at the Nuremberg Trials. 
The peace of God movement was one remarkable new 
development of the idea in Galatians that in Christ there was 
neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free - at least within the society 
of Christians. And just as the peace movement developed, 
another symbol of Christian unity in the West was taking 
powerful shape, a symbol which endures within the Christian 
world to this day. One bishop built on the ancient prestige of his 
diocese in Rome to act as a focus for unity in western society. 
The culmination of this new universality in the twelfth century 
was a claim by the Popes in Rome to universal monarchy. It was 
a claim which it must be said was never accepted by the 
churches of the East. Even in the West it proved impossible to 
turn the claim into reality, in the face of the suspicions of secular 
rulers, especially because of hostility from a rival symbol of 
western unity, the Holy Roman Emperor. 
~everthel'ess the medieval Western Church produced an 
overarching framework of thinking and institutions which for 
centuries successfully transcended cultural and linguistic 
identities. From the twelfth century, when the papal claim to 
universal monarchy was formalized, the papacy built up a code 
of universal law, canon law, which was administered in church 
courts throughout Europe, and which was remarkably successful 
in shaping and regulating western society. Just as successful was 
the idea of unity which survived even the murderous disputes 
between the popes and the Holy Roman Emperors. It was an idea 
which was given plausibility by the use of the universal 
language, Latin, by the foundation of international religious 
orders, and more regrettably in our eyes, by the military 
campaigns of the Crusades against non-Christians. Anyone who 
is sensitive to the style of Romanesque and Gothic church 
buildings from the Shetlands to the Holy Land will perceive the 
cultural unity of this world. 
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Because of all this, the medieval West was indeed a single 
society, a res~ublica Christiana. This phrase could be translated 
a "Christian commonwealth" or simply as "Christendom". It was 
" an idea which owed as much to the Roman Empire as to 
Christianity and this fact was increasingly obvious because 
alongside canon laws, the law of the old empire was revived as 
civil law. This was not a dead legal code; it grew alongside 
canon law as a standard for regulating the lives of people within 
the Christian commonwealth, even providing guidelines for their 
relationships with non-Christians, just as the imperial law-code 
had done. It was the first system of international law. With two 
such powerful sources, Christ and the Roman Empire, the idea 
of a universal society has had an enduring fascination for Europe 
- and so for America. Perhaps the most striking symbol of this 
Christian society with a common purpose was the moment in 
1494 when the then Pope, Alexander VI, acted as a referee 
between the Spanish and Portuguese Monarchies and allotted to 
them separated spheres of influence in the new lands which they 
were discovering outside Europe in Africa and America. We do 
not need to approve of what 'Alexander did to see the 
significance of it. 
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Yet this was just the moment when the structures of the 
medieval respublica Christiana were fatally fractured. Partly it i 
was that individual monarchies were getting too powerful to set 
much store by the idea of a universal society which would 
constrain them. Their relationships were increasingly governed 
C 
by expediency, without much consideration for the special 
character of Christendom. The King of France, whose title was 
"the most Christian King", allied with the Ottoman Turks 
b 1 I 
against his hated Christian enemy the Holy Roman Emperor. 
One of the images of this mood which has struck me forcibly 
recently is the cover illustration of a new history of the Knights 
of Malta: one of the military orders set up specially to defend 
medieval Christendom against Islam. The picture is the 
reproduction of a miniature showing Prince Zizim, brother of the 
Ottoman Sultan, being feasted by the Knights in their then 
headquarters on the island of Rhodes. They had granted him 
asylum against his brother; so here were the brethren of 
organizations sworn to fight the infidel, who had chosen to ally 
with one infidel against another to further their long-term aims. 
The realism of Macchiavelli was transforming the chivalric ideal 
of the Middle Ages. There could be no more telling symbol of 
the new atmosphere in which Renaissance power politicians 
operated, and the Church was drawn in like everyone else. 
But the fatal blow to the ideal of Christendom was dealt by the 
Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. Half of Europe 
rejected the idea that the Pope had a special role in God's plan. 
As the official statement of faith of my own Church put it in 
1563, "The Bishop of Rome hath no jurisdiction in this realm of 
England". This was not a rejection of the link between church 
and political power which had begun in the Roman Empire. 
Quite the contrary; secular monarchs seized control of the 
Church from the Pope for themselves, and in practice there was 
very little difference in the political position of Protestant or 
Catholic rulers. Whether rulers were Catholic or Protestant, they 
all affirmed the identification of the Church with the whole of 
society. They persecuted radical Christians of that time who 
went back to the foundation documents of Christianity and tried 
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to separate Christianity completely from politics. Once 
monarchs had rejected the Pope's universal authority, there was 
no limit on the power of individual political units. Even the Pope 
went quiet about the idea of his universal monarchy during the 
seventeenth century. The concept of the sovereign state became 
dominant: it banished the medieval idea of a universal society to 
the margins. The sovereign state is still with us. 
Most of these sovereign states started as family businesses; that 
is they were multi-national entities, representing the power of a 
royal or imperial dynasty rather than an individual grouping of a. 
national language. Many of them therefore borrowed the 
classical and medieval word for a power with no superior 
supreme over several peoples, and called themselves empires; 
their model was the so-called Holy Roman Empire, by then itself 
a family business of the Hapsburg dynasty. During the 
seventeenth century most states also took on a single official 
version of Christian identity, after a series of hideously 
destructive confessional wars. However, some of these dynastic 
sovereign states could and did make a further and very 
significant identification. They allied with a particular language 
grouping, something which had rarely been a decisive factor in 
the politics of medieval Europe. This was beginning to happen 
in France during the seventeenth century; then the French 
Revolution and its aftermath would give renewed power to the 
alliance between power-structure and language-grouping. 
The ideology of the French Revolution, exported throughout 
Europe, was that the state was the people in arms. Naturally this 
was most persuasive an image where the people could all 
understand each other's language. The classic case of such a 
success in nation-state building in the nineteenth century is Italy, 
but it is instructive to see how much myth-making was necessary 
even for this text-book example: a single modern Italian 
language was virtually created alongside the many regional 
versions of Italian, in order to make the Italian nation-state 
plausible. Such a sovereign nation-state claimed an intimate 
relationship with its people's identity. In the aftermath of the 
C!.!! 
First World War, the victorious allies did their best to create yet 
more nation-states on the ruins of the dynastic states which had 
fought themselves to destruction. President Woodrow Wilson 
had the idea that self-determination was founded upon the 
nineteenth century liberal idea that humanity was naturally 
divided into nations, and that every nations should have its own 
state. It is arguable that this notion has cost as many lives as the 
ideology of Stalin. It redowns to the credit of Robert Lansing, 
Wilson's Secretary of State, that he said this at the time; "The 
more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of 
self-determination, the more convinced I am of the danger of 
putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to 
the basis of impossible demands. What effect will it have on the 
Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the 
Boers? Will it not breed rebellion? The phrase is simply loaded 
with dynamite. It will raise hopes that can never be realized. It 
will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be 
discredited, to be the called the dream of an idealist ... What a 
calamity that the phrase was ever uttered." 
In 1918 one fatally unresolved question was whether the nation- 
state existed to serve its people, or the people to serve the 
nation-state. Democrats give one answer, authoritarian, Fascists 
and Stalinists another. Out of this confusion came the awful 
events of the Second World War. 
So it was in those chaotic months of 1945, that I found myself 
involved in a further piece of tidying-up of these nation-states on 
the borders of Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia. Even at the time, 
we all agreed that the neatest solution would have been to 
restore the Austro-Hungarian empire after its quarter-century of 
oblivion. At least the recreation of a Hapsburg dynastic state 
would have left all nationalities equally and impartially 
discontented. The official title of one of the countries whose 
borders I was trying to define was "the Kingdom of the Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes", which revealed what a strangely-mixed 
potion such a nation-state as Yugoslavia could be. As we now 
realize, there was much more and much less to so-called 
Yugoslavia than that. 
Now we live with the consequences of these two centuries of 
western obsession with the nation-state. We have even exported 
the beast to the former colonies of the European empires in what 
is sometimes called the developing world. Virtually none of the 
boundaries of these former colonies have been altered after 
independence, although seldom did these boundaries have much 
meaning before Europeans arrived. It is hardly surprising if 
some of these states seem to have ceased to have any meaningful 
existence. In Rwanda and Burundi, an arbitrary status division 
encouraged by the colonial power has been turned into a quite 
spurious nationality division, so that Tutsi and Hutu extremists 
battle to wipe each other out to construct a single pure nation 
state, a lunatic version of the myth of nineteenth century Italy. 
Even Christian leaders in those unhappy countries have been 
trained by this madness, and the Church has been split on ethnic 
lines which take little account of theology. 
We must also recognize how often religion has made such 
situations worse by adding a dimension of antiquity to identities 
which became national in the nineteenth century model. The 
problems in Yugoslavia, in the Middle East and in Northern 
Ireland arise from the association of religion with national 
identity. They are inherently difficult of compromise precisely 
because of the religious dimension, especially for those, like 
Jews, Christians and Muslims, who claim to worship one God. A 
monotheist can be bilingual; a monotheist can perhaps be 
binational. But a monotheist cannot be bireligious. . 
What is worse is that even our modem-day revival of an 
international commonwealth or resvublica, the United Nations, 
is still shackled to the nation-state as its very name reveals. So 
was its unhappy predecessor, the significantly-named League of 
Nations. Behind these organizations are the ghosts of older, 
.universalist ideals quite incompatible with the nation-state: the 
Roman Empire, the internationalism of civil and canon law, the 
. . . . 

There is a phrase now so much used in some Christian circles 
that it has become a clich6, but that is not to say that it is beyond 
usefulness. It is that of "the wounded healer". Yes, physicians 
must heal themselves, but they may inspire more trust in their 
patients if they have the honesty to admit their own obvious 
wounds. One of the most heartening features of the twentieth 
century has been the growth of ecurnenism in the Christian 
Church. The ecumenical movement has had many 
disappointments, but one cannot expect the wounds of nineteen 
centuries to be bound up in a single century. One of the 
achievements of ecumenism has been to release Christian 
historians from their confessional shackles, to begin examining 
those ancient wounds afresh. To undertake this effort of 
examination or reconsideration is to take the past seriously, not 
to forget it. Remember my Serbian bishop: with his centuries of 
bitter memories, he cried to me, the Western liberal, "Why do 
you not understand?" No body is more dangerous for peace than 
those who say "Forget the past." No one is more helpful than 
those who say "We must heal the past." 
The search for healing in understanding our past will inevitably 
lead us to finding what is wrong in our own past. I have not 
spared the Christian Church in this survey of its relations with 
states. It has betrayed its supposed universality from an early 
date. It has allied with the powerful, and given sacred 
legitimation for long periods of time to a whole variety of human 
institutions, including slavery. Western Christians have tried, 
and failed, to establish their own universal monarchy on the 
basis of the bishopric of Rome. You will have noted that the 
modern nation-state is an outgrowth of Western Christian 
society, yet this nation-state has now spread throughout the 
modern world and has put in a claim to being indispensable, 
whatever the cultural setting. Perhaps it is time for Christian 
churches to recall nation-states to their origins, and to give them 
a sense of their own contingency, even their temporary place 
amid human organization. 

wrecked the richness and variety of that country. In South 
Africa, Nelson Mandela in the hour of victory turned away from 
the opportunity to settle old scores with oppressors, and has won 
the gratitude of those who formerly sought to crush their 
opponents by terror. In neither case has the past been forgotten. 
It has been faced, and then forgiveness has begun. 
The ultimate human act of humility is to apologize. That is the 
clear-eyed recognition of a wrong done to another: a wound 
inflicted which will remain a wound until it is acknowledged. 
This is something which the Christian church in an ecumenical 
century can offer with a clear conscience to the world as an 
example. The Western Church has begun, for instance to see the 
horror of its record in relation to Judaism. Pope John XXIII 
removed passages about the conversion of the Jews from prayers 
in the Roman Catholic liturgy, and the present Pope has also 
spelled out his Church's consciousness of its responsibility for 
past miseries. Indeed, the pontificate of Pope John Paul I1 has 
been notable for its apologies. Here is the successor of the 
would-be universal monarchs of the Middle Ages, head of a 
Church which for many still seems over-authoritarian in many of 
its attitudes; yet he is prepared to admit ancient mistakes. Pope 
John Paul has sought to make amends for the Church's past 
attitude to women. He has even issued a statement of regret for 
the Church's treatment of the great scientist Galileo, one of the 
worst blunders in Christian history. In Spain, the Roman 
Catholic Church hierarchy has begun facing up to its role in a 
civil war which divided Spanish society and brought half a 
century of hatred and oppression. 
Apologies can bring rich fruits. We have seen in Europe the 
remarkable effect produced by the statesmanlike apologies made 
by successive German Presidents, von Weiszacker, and Herzog, 
for Cierman actions in the Second World War. At the root of this 
series of acts of atonement was the moving sight of that great 
German statesman, Willy Brandt, kneeling before the Warsaw 
Ghetto. On the other side of the same conflicts, we have heard 
President Vaclav Have1 express sorrow for the expulsion of 



